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Abstract 
We designed an experiment that examines how knowledge about the price of a 
good, and the time at which the information is received, affects how the good is 
experienced. The good in question was wine, and the price was either high or low. 
Our results suggest that hosts offering wine to guests can safely reveal the price: 
much is gained if the wine is expensive, and little is lost if it is cheap. Disclosing 
the  high  price  before  tasting  the  wine  produces  considerably  higher  ratings, 
although only from women. Disclosing the low price, by contrast, does not result 
in lower ratings. Our finding supports the notion that price not only serves to clear 
markets, it also serves as a marketing tool; it influences expectations that in turn 
shape  a  consumer’s  experience.  In  addition,  our  results  suggest  that  men  and 
women respond differently to attribute information concerning wine. 
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1. Introduction 
Much economic analysis assumes that price simply reflects market structure, but 
price can also be a marketing tool, for example if the price tag itself affects how a 
good is perceived (see, e.g., Cialdini 1998). Textbook illustrations of supply and 
demand typically feature downward sloping demand curves. For most goods this 
is a highly plausible assumption. Price may have a positive effect on demand, 
however, when the good in question is used for the purpose of costly signaling. In 
the case of positional goods (Veblen goods), the purpose is to signal affluence and 
thereby assert high status (see, e.g., Frank 1985, 1999). A closely related example 
on  the  supply  side  is  when  increased  monetary  incentives  crowd  out  intrinsic 
motivation  for  providing  a  service  (Gneezy  and  Rustichini  2000a,  2000b; 
Mellström  and  Johannesson  2008).  In  this  case  the  purpose  may  be  to  signal 
altruism and thereby achieve social esteem (Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Ellingsen 
and Johannesson 2008). In both cases the price tag carries a semantic component, 
in the sense that it affects the signaling value of the commodity in question.  
In practice, it can be hard to distinguish the signaling value of a high price from 
the  tendency  to  associate  high  price  with  high  quality.  Consumers  have  been 
found to expect a positive correlation between price and quality (Rao and Monroe 
1989).  Consistent  with  this  expectation  a  meta-analysis  has  found  positive 
correlations  between  price  and  quality  ratings  for  most  of  the  1,200  product 
markets surveyed, but also that the range of these correlations is large, and even 
negative for some markets (Tellis and Wernerfelt 1987). Consumers’ perceptions 
of objective price-quality relationships have been found to be only moderately 
accurate (Lichtenstein and Burton 1989), and the price-quality heuristic can be 
misleading,  for  example  when  goods  of  low  quality  are  priced  high  (Cialdini 
1998).  
In this paper, we address one particular good – wine – to shed some more light on 
the relationship between the price of a wine and the individual enjoyment of the 
wine. Specifically, we explore if, and how, information about the price of a wine 
affects the experience of tasting the wine. The novelty of our paper is that we vary 
both the timing of the price information and the magnitude of the price for a good 
such as wine. These variables have previously not been explored jointly, and in 
particular not for an “ambiguous” good like wine. 3 
Attribute information, such as the price or the ingredients of the good, has a more 
powerful effect on the perception of quality when the experience of the good is 
ambiguous  (Hoch  and  Ha  1986).  Tasting  wine  is  a  relatively  ambiguous 
experience for many consumers. Objective measures of wine quality are not easily 
defined,  and  consumer  tastes  with  regard  to  wine  are  highly  heterogeneous 
(Amerine and Roessler 1976; Lecocq and Visser 2006). Wine judges display low 
within-subject  correlations  when unknowingly judging the same wine  multiple 
times (Hodgson 2008).
1  Tasters are only marginally better than a random guess at 
distinguishing vintage years from non-vintage years from the same vineyard, or 
reserve bottlings from regular bottlings from the same vineyard and year, despite 
large differences in price (Weil 2001, 2005).
2  And in a large sample of blind 
tastings, Goldstein et al. (2008) find that more expensive wines fail to get higher 
ratings. 
Previous  research  indicates  that  price  information  may  be  an  important 
determinant of the experienced pleasantness of a wine (Brochet 2001; Plassmann 
et al. 2008). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Plassmann et 
al. (2008) conduct a within-subject study with 20 participants. Each subject tasted 
three wines multiple times, but were no t always told which wine they were 
tasting. Subjects believed they were tasting five different wines that differed 
greatly in price. Two of these wines were in fact duplicates of two of the other 
wines, but labeled with a different price tag. For the tasti ng observations where 
the subjects were unaware of the price, ratings did not differ between two samples 
of the same wine. By contrast, when the supposed price was disclosed, the price 
level was found to correlate positively with experienced pleasantness,  measured 
through both subjective reports and fMRI scans.
3  This research highlights the 
                                                 
1 In fact, only about 10% of the judges were able to replicate their score within a single medal 
group.  Moreover,  when  the  judges  were  consistent  this  usually  happened  for  wines  that  they 
disliked.  This  study  is  particularly  interesting  given  that  another  study  has  found  a  positive 
relationship between price and medal status such that awards can influence a winery’s economic 
success (Lima 2006). 
2 In Weil (2005) subjects are to distinguish between a reserve bottling and a regular bottling, from 
the same producer and year. Among those who can dis tinguish between these two bottlings, only 
half prefer the reserve, whereas the wines differ in price by an order of magnitude. 
3 Subjects’ brains were scanned while subjects tasted the wine. The results show that increasing 
the price of the wine increases blood-oxygen-level dependent activity in an area thought to encode 
for experienced pleasantness (the medial orbitofrontal cortex). 4 
potential  role  of  marketing  in  shaping  how  we  experience  the  goods  that  we 
consume.  
Plassmann  et  al.  (2008)  do  not  ascertain  whether  expectations  constitute  the 
mechanism whereby price affects the tasting experience. We extend their analysis 
by using an alternative methodology from consumer research. Our aim is to shed 
more light on the price effect of wine, and, in particular, to better understand the 
mechanism  through  which  price  information  exerts  influence  on  the  tasting 
experience. Unlike in Plassmann et al. (2008), our setup relies on between-subject 
comparisons, and does not involve deception.
4   
Our approach combines an information treatment with a timing treatment. By 
varying both the provision and the type of extrinsic information, as well as the 
timing of this information relative to the first -hand experience of the wine, our 
experiment sheds light on how consumers use extrinsic information about the 
product in forming an opinion about it. A blind setting, in which the extrinsic 
information is not disclosed, is compared to a setting in which the information is 
disclosed before tasting, as well as a setting in which the information is disclosed 
after tasting.  
A similar setup has been used in consumer research, applied to clothing, paper 
towels and ground beef (Hoch and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988). It has 
recently been applied to beer by Lee et al. (2006) who look at how knowing about 
a  “secret  ingredient”  (vinegar  added  by  the  experimenter)  affects  experienced 
pleasantness (Lee et al. 2006). All three studies find that extrinsic information 
provided prior to first-hand experience with the good in question has a significant 
effect of how the good is experienced, whereas extrinsic information provided 
after  the  experience  does  not.  These  studies  highlight  the  role  of  consuming 
expectancies,  a  subclass  of  “conceptual  consumption”  which  includes  a  wide 
range of cognitive concepts (see, e.g., Ariely and Norton 2009 for a review). 
We replace the beer in Lee et al. (2006) with wine, and replace information about 
a secret ingredient with information about the wine’s retail price per bottle ($40 or 
                                                 
4 It is not self-evident that labeling a $90 wine as a $10 wine captures the appropriate price effect, 
which would be the difference in subjective well-being experienced when tasting a wine without 
knowing the true price relative to tasting this wine when aware of the price. 5 
$5). Vinegar in beer is likely to be bad news about the beverage to the minds of 
most  beer  consumers.  By  contrast,  our  experiment  was  designed  to  allow  for 
positive information (the wine is expensive) as well as negative information (the 
wine is cheap).
5  Thus, we focus on price as an attribute, an important element in 
marketing (Cialdini 1998).  
The first purpose of our study is to gage the magnitude of both the positive and 
the negative expectational effect.  Given previous work (e.g., Plassmann et al. 
2008), we hypothesize that individuals will assign a higher rating to the wine 
when they know its high price, relative to those tasting it without knowing the 
price. We assume that many consumers expect a $40 wine to be a highly pleasant 
experience. We hypothesize that individuals will assign a lower rating to the wine 
if they know the price and consider it to be cheap. We assume that many 
consumers will not expect a $5 wine to be a very positive experience. 
Second, we expect the timing of the price information to make a difference. Hoch 
and  Ha  (1986),  Levin  and  Gaeth  (1988),  and  Lee  et  al.  (2006)  find  that 
information  has  a  significant  effect  only  when  disclosed  prior  to  first -hand 
experience of the good in question. On the basis of this we expect the information 
about price to have a larger effect, relative to the blind condition, in the before 
condition than in the after condition. In other words, we expect individuals to give 
higher ratings to the expensive wine when they know about the high price before 
tasting, but not necessarily when finding out about the price after tasting, and 
similarly with the cheap wine we expect individuals to give lower ratings when 
they know about the price before tasting. 
Third, we test whether there is a gender difference in how the  price information 
matters. The possibility of a gender difference was not intended as the focus of 
our study. It is highly plausible, however, that concerns about identity and social 
image  form  part  of  a  price  effect.  Gender  differences  in  behavior  are 
commonplace in the experimental economics literature in general (Croson and 
Gneezy  2009)  and  a  number  of  studies  find  that  men  and  women  respond 
differently to treatments designed to trigger social concerns (e.g.,  Hasseldine and 
Hite 2003;  Griskevicius et al. 2007; Mellström and Johannesson 2008). Given 
                                                 
5 Whether the prices are perceived in this way depends partly on the subjects’ spending habits. We 
address this issue later in the paper. 6 
this, we have no reason to expect the effect of price on experienced pleasantness 
to be the same for men and women. Plassmann et al. (2008) do not control for 
such gender effects, nor do the previous studies that employ the same design with 
regard to the timing of information. Effetz and Shayo (2009) use a simpler timing 
design involving candy and don’t find any gender differences with regard to the 
timing effect. We believe that wine differs from candy in two important respects: 
(1) wine is a (potentially) positional good; (2) many tasters find the experience of 
a wine rather ambiguous. 
We find that an expensive wine gets considerably higher ratings when tasters are 
informed about the high price before tasting, relative to tasting “blind” – but only 
from female tasters. By contrast, women that taste the wine before being told the 
price do not assign significantly higher ratings, suggesting that once they form a 
first-hand opinion the attribute information only has some effect. For men there is 
no  significant  difference  between  any  of  the  three  conditions.  A  possible 
interpretation of this discrepancy is that men and women respond differently to 
attribute information, with men being less sensitive to such cues. Alternatively, 
this might point to differences in how men and women relate to wine, or status 
goods, or both.  
For the tasters that sampled the cheap wine, being informed about the price tag 
did not produce any noticeable changes in average ratings. This could point to an 
asymmetry between how positive and negative information shape perceptions of 
quality. Another possible explanation is that the bad news simply wasn’t that bad: 
whereas the expensive wine was  considerably more expensive than the tasters 
reported usually spending on wine, the cheap wine was simply in the lower range 
of typical spending. We elaborate on this later in the paper. 
The outline of the paper is the following. We start by describing the setup of the 
experiment, then present our results, and finish the paper with a discussion. 
2. Setup 
All subjects followed the same procedure, illustrated in Figure 1 below. First, they 
received some information about the experiment. Next, they tasted one of two 
wines. The wine was either expensive or cheap. Finally, they received a short 
questionnaire, at the beginning of which they were asked to rate the wine. There 7 
were  three  information  settings.  In  the  “blind”  setting,  the  price  was  not 
mentioned in the experiment. In the “before” setting, the price was mentioned in 
the information  about  the experiment,  prior to tasting the wine.  In the “after” 
setting, the price was mentioned at the top of the questionnaire, after having tasted 
the wine but still before rating it. Subjects were allocated randomly to one of the 





Apart from the price, subjects received the same information in all three settings. 
They were told that the wine came from Portugal, that it was made out of a blend 
of different grapes, that they were to receive a glass of wine that they were to taste 
and that they subsequently would be asked to rate the wine.
6  In the actual tasting 
of the wine, subjects were given  wine glasses filled with a small quantity of the 
wine and then given a few minutes to taste the wine. Once the subjects had 
indicated that they were done tasting, they were asked to set aside the glass until 
the experiment was over. Next, they were asked to assign a rating, using a visual 
analogue  scale  ranging  from  “undrinkable”  to  “perfection”,  with  “OK”  as  the 
midpoint. Aside from this the scale was not labeled. Subjects were asked to circle 
                                                 
6 Subjects in the same session were randomized to different treatments. Making sure everybody 
read something made subjects not realize there were different treatments. In addition, we did not 
want subjects to sense that we were exploring the effect of the price tag. Embedding the price 
information among other information about the wine made this less obvious (see the Appendix for 
the instructions). 8 
a point (a tick mark) anywhere on the axis. In the statistical analysis we convert 
this to a 100 point scale.  
3. Results 
The study was conducted in Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts, during the 
fall/winter semester of 2008-09. 135 individuals (40% women) tasted and rated a 
red wine with a retail price of $40, and 131 individuals (33% women) tasted and 
rated  a  red  wine  with  a  retail  price  of  $5.  The  subjects  consisted  mainly  of 
students and researchers at three universities. The average age was 29 (min: 21; 
max: 66). 43-47 subjects participated in each treatment. 
3.1 The Expensive Wine 
Across all experimental settings and subjects the average rating of the expensive 
wine was about 59 out of 100. Average ratings by setting and gender are shown 
below. The only significant gender difference is in the blind setting, with men 
giving the expensive wine a higher rating than women (t-test: p=0.038, Mann-
Whitney: p=0.031). 
Figure 2 
Average rating of the $40 wine, by gender and experimental setting. 
 
The experimental data shows that the price can have a large effect on wine ratings, 
but this effect differs greatly between the sexes. Compared to the blind setting, 
women, on average, assigned considerably higher ratings to the wine when they 
were informed about the $40 price tag before tasting. In terms of a 100 point 












































relative to when the female subjects have no information. In terms of the visual 
analogue scale that subjects used for rating the wine, this effect represents about a 
quarter of the distance between “OK” and “perfection”. The effect is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, regardless of whether we run the regression separately 
for both  sexes  or jointly, incorporating  a dummy for being  female as well as 
interaction terms for being female and the two information treatments. In the joint 
regression, the interaction term is statistically significant, and a Wald test rejects 
that the sum of the coefficients on “before” and the interaction term “before × 
female” is equal to zero (p=0.024). Men, by contrast did not assign higher ratings 
to the wine when they were informed about the price before tasting it compared to 
when they had no information.  
Table 1 
Experimental results for the expensive wine. Blind setting is baseline. 
 
Neither  women  nor  men  assigned  higher  ratings  to  the  wine  when  they  were 
informed about the price tag after tasting compared to the blind setting. There is a 
noticeable tendency for men to assign lower ratings to the wine when they are told 
about  the  price  after  tasting.  This  effect  is  marginally  statistically  significant 
(p=0.09). Ten subjects, however, reported having some form of wine training, and 
if we extend our regression analysis to control for this the coefficient becomes 
smaller  for  men  and  seizes  to  be  even  marginally  statistically  significant 
All subjects Men Women
Information about the price:
  Before tasting (and rating) -2.00 -2.00 11.48
(0.643) (0.642)      (0.028)**
  After tasting (but still prior to rating) -9.11 -9.11 6.83
   (0.088)*     (0.088)* (0.216)
Gender
  Female -10.09
      (0.039)**
Gender interactions
  Before x Female
1 13.47
     (0.044)**
  After x Female 15.93
     (0.037)**
Constant 62.81 62.81 52.72
       (0.000)***        (0.000)***         (0.000)***
Observations 135 81 54
R
2 0.058 0.044 0.083
Robust p-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1) Note: a Wald test rejects that Before + Before x Female = 0. Prob > F = 0.024.10 
(coefficient size: -7.40 instead of -9.10, p=0.185). We do not present this extended 
framework as our main model, because the number of subjects reporting wine 
training was small. Controlling for expertise is justified, however, since it has 
previously  been  found  that  experts  rate  wines  differently  from  non-experts 
(Goldstein et al. 2008). Moreover, they were all men. Nonetheless, this indicates 
that the negative effect for men in the after condition is not robust. 
We also compare the “before” and “after” coefficients for women. The estimated 
“before”  coefficient  is  almost  twice  the  size  of  the  “after”  coefficient. 
Nevertheless, a Wald test is unable to reject that the two coefficients are equal 
(p=0.36). It is thus possible that a high price also affects how women rate wines 
after they have tasted it, but that our sample size is simply too small to capture 
this effect. Note, however, that the “before” coefficient is statistically significant 
from the control whereas the ”after” coefficient is not, thus a larger sample size 
could on the other hand lead to a significant difference between the “before” and 
“after” coefficients. 
In other words, extrinsic information about the price arriving after the subject has 
had first-hand experience of the good does not significantly alter the subject’s 
opinion of the good’s quality. This is consistent with previous studies using the 
same design with other types of information: Hoch and Ha (1986), Levin and 
Gaeth  (1988),  Lee  et  al.  (2006)  all  find  that  information  provided  before 
experiencing the good has a significant effect on how the good is perceived, and 
that information provided afterwards does not. 
3.2 The Cheap Wine 
Across all experimental settings and subjects the average rating of the cheap wine 
was about 57. In the blind setting, the average rating was actually slightly higher 
for the 5$ wine than for the $40 wine (60.0 versus 58.5), in line with the finding in 
Goldstein et al. (2008) that most people do not prefer expensive wines, although 
this difference is not statistically significant.   
For the cheap wine, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that knowledge 
about the price has no effect on ratings, for either gender in any of the settings. 
Our data gives some indication of a corresponding negative effect of knowing 11 
about the low price of a cheap wine, but the absolute size of the effect is small and 
not statistically significant. 
Table 2 
Experimental results for the cheap wine. Blind setting is baseline. 
 
In a post-experiment questionnaire, subjects reported spending on average $13 on 
a bottle of wine, with a standard deviation of about $6. Only two of 266 subjects 
reported spending $40 or more. Only about 5%  reported spending more than $20. 
In the light of this, the $40 must be considered expensive relative to what the 
subjects usually spent on wine. By contrast, 16 subjects reported spending 5$ or 
less on average, and 40 % reported spending $10 or less.
7  Hence, the treatment 
effect of the low price cannot be considered to be directly proportional to the 
treatment effect of the high price  – i.e., it is possible that the cheap wine simply 
wasn’t  cheap  enough.  Subjects  were  asked  to  indicate  their  average  weekly 
consumption of wine (number of glasses; frequency in parenthesis): < 1 (33%), 1-
3 (40%), 4-6 (21%), 7-10 (6%), or > 10 (0%). 
                                                 
7 There were no observable gender differences in spending behavior. 
All subjects Men Women
Information about the price:
  Before tasting (and rating) -4.39 -4.39 1.15
(0.40) (0.40) (0.87)
  After tasting (but still prior to rating) -7.13 -7.13 -3.08
(0.19) (0.19) (0.72)
Gender
  Female 3.02
(0.67)
Gender interactions
  Before x Female
1 5.54
(0.53)
  After x Female 4.05
(0.69)
Constant 58.98 58.98 62.00
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 131 88 43
R
2 0.042 0.022 0.008
Robust p-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%12 
4. Discussion 
Consumer’  perceptions  of  objective  price-quality  relationships  are  not  always 
very  accurate,  and  this  can  have  important  implications.  In  the  marketplace, 
consumers may face vast amounts of information about the good they are about to 
consume. Price may be one of the more salient types of information, and if many 
people are not ready to expand time and effort to investigate the price-quality 
relationship, then this leaves room for the use of price as an advertising tool, in a 
way that may be unrelated to the objective quality of the good (e.g., Cialdini 
1998). 
We  find  that  women  assign  considerably  higher  ratings  to  a  wine  if  they  are 
informed that it is expensive before tasting it. If they are informed that a wine is 
expensive  after  tasting  it,  assigned  ratings  are  still  higher  than  in  the  blind 
condition, but neither this difference nor the one between “after” and “before” are 
statistically significant.  When the wine is  cheap, we do not  find any  negative 
effects of being informed about the price. For male tasters, we do not find any 
significant effects of knowing about the price – high or low – on average ratings.  
Our main finding should surprise few: knowledge about the high price of a good 
can affect how it is experienced. In a world where luxury goods manufacturers 
routinely incorporate easily recognized logotypes into their designs, it can safely 
be assumed that knowledge about the high price of a good is considered a positive 
attribute that may confer status  on its  owner (Frank 1999).  In addition,  many 
consumers use a price-quality heuristic that leads them to expect higher prices to 
be correlated with better quality, potentially influencing the actual consumption 
experience.  Tasting  wine  has  been  shown  to  be  an  ambiguous  experience  for 
many, if not all, consumers. Objective measures of wine quality are not easily 
defined; consumer tastes with regard to wine are highly heterogeneous. Extrinsic 
information, such as the price of the good, is likely to play a particularly important 
role when consumers are less confident in their own perceptions of quality.  
In our view, the absence of a significant corresponding negative effect for a low 
price is most likely due to the design of our treatment, and not indicative of a deep 
asymmetry in how people react to high and low prices. In the post-experiment 
questionnaire,  subjects  reported  their  average  level  of  spending  on  wine.  The 13 
expensive wine was considerably higher than this average expenditure. The cheap 
wine,  by  contrast,  was  not  below  average  expenditure  in  a  way  that  can  be 
considered proportional. In other words, most of our subjects typically consumed 
cheap wine. It is not surprising then that being informed about the cheap price did 
not  have  significant  effects  on  ratings.  It  could  be  argued  that  a  $5  wine  is 
probably more in line with what tasters in the blind setting are used to drinking 
and would expect to be offered, compared to a $40 wine. However, the $5 wine 
was the cheapest wine with characteristics comparable to the $40 wine, thus a 
different  type  of  subject  pool  might  be  interesting  to  study  in  the  future  (i.e. 
subjects who find $5 wines to be very cheap). 
With regard to the gender difference, our finding can be interpreted in two ways: 
(1) There is no gender difference. Either the female price effect is a false positive 
or the absence of a male price effect is a false negative. (2) Men and women 
respond differently to social cues and/or to status concerns regarding positional 
goods. It is not self-evident that men and women should have evolved to react the 
same  way  to  such  cues,  and  ample  experimental  evidence  indicates  that  such 
differences  exist  (e.g.,  Croson  and  Gneezy  2009).  For  example,  in  many 
experiments  women are more sensitive than men to  subtle cues  and are more 
likely to behave according to the social norm.  Thus, in our context women might 
be more inclined to give higher ratings to an expensive wine because it “should” 
taste better – an expectation which in turn might actually change their tasting 
experience. In our view, the second explanation is at least as plausible as the first, 
and merits further exploration. Even though the wine tasting was not  a social 
interaction, status concerns could be triggered heuristically by the mere fact of 
subjects  consuming  a  positional  good  or  for  purposes  of  self-signaling.  Thus, 
disentangling concerns for social cues/norms from concerns for status is another 
potential venue for future research. It is interesting to note that Weil (2005, 2007) 
finds  some  evidence  of  a  gender  difference  in  two  studies  with  the  twin  and 
singleton design. In that setup, two bottles of wine are poured into four containers 
and tasters are given three of the containers and asked to distinguish which one 
differs from the other two. A random guess has 1/3 chance of being correct. Men 
appear to be somewhat more correct than women when guessing. 14 
Our study builds on previous research on the relationship between the price and 
the  subjective  experience  of  wine,  in  particular  Goldstein  et  al.  (2008)  and 
Plassmann  et  al.  (2008),  through  the  application  of  a  methodology  used  in 
marketing research. That marketing actions can affect the experience of a good is 
in itself not a novel finding. Marketing research has for a long time sought to 
schematize  and  empirically  evaluate  the  interaction  of  top-down  cognitive 
processes, to which extrinsic information is addressed, with bottom-up sensory 
processes, i.e., the experience of the intrinsic qualities of the good. Combining 
different variables in the way we did it and applying it to wine is however novel. 
Attribute  information  may  lead  consumers  to  invest  more  effort  when 
experiencing the good (Hoch and Ha 1986). We did not control for the amount of 
time spent tasting the wine. It should also be noted that neither our study nor 
Plassmann  et  al.  (2008)  provides  much  detail  about  how  expectations,  once 
formed, interact with first-hand experience of a good. We do not know whether 
our  subjects  were  actively  searching  for  confirmatory  evidence  of  an 
expensive/nice taste, or whether the wine simply tasted better during the actual 
tasting, such that the cognitive work on expectations occurred while processing 
the price information rather than while tasting. Future research should seek to 
shed more light on this process. Other interesting extensions include specifying 
what  type  of  taste-related  judgment  the  subjects  are  expected  to  make  (e.g., 
quality or taste pleasantness) as well as testing scale reliability by using more than 
one measure. 
It would also be interesting to explore whether our findings extend to a more 
natural setting than a stylized blind tasting.
8 A recent study that takes place in 
both the laboratory  and the field finds that for the goods studied (candy and 
restaurant meals), prices mainly affect demand through the budget constraint 
(Heffetz and Shayo 2009). As we point out above, however, attribute information 
has a stronger effect on quality perception when the experience of the good is 
ambiguous (Hoch and Ha 1986), as arguably is the case for wine. It would thus be 
interesting to explore a setup similar to that of Heffetz and Shayo (2009) with a  
product such as wine. 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of the importance of the lab vs. the field, see, e.g., Harrison and List (2004), 
Levitt and List (2007) and Falk and Heckman (2009). 15 
Finally, a very natural extension is to explore whether our findings extend to other 
types of goods, and in particular whether the difference in how men and women 
respond to attribute information is product-specific or indicative of a more general 
difference in preferences between men and women. 
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